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Marine Corps contingency contracting is a critical function of supporting 
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deployed operational forces when normal supply channels cannot.  Characterized by a 
small number of contingency contracting officers, enlisted personnel and high turnover 
rates, the contingency contracting knowledge base is not being maintained.  The purpose 
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shares the knowledge that is essential to the deployed contingency contracting process 
(DCCP).  This study builds upon recent work to integrate knowledge management and 
system design and utilizes knowledge-based organizational process redesign (KOPeR), a 
measurement-driven redesign knowledge system, for analytical support.  Results from 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND  
As stated in the “Marine Corps Strategy 21,” General J.L. Jones, Commandant of 
the Marine Corps, has referred to the Marine Corps as the Nation’s “Total Force in 
Readiness” (Department of the Navy, 2000).  With capabilities that span the entire 
spectrum of conflict, the Marine Corps has been called upon at an ever increasing rate to 
deal with situations ranging from humanitarian disaster relief to hot spots that erupt 
around the world.    
Getting Marine Corps forces on the deck in response to a crisis, regardless of its 
nature, is the culmination of a monumental logistical effort.  Keeping our Marine Corps 
forces supported and mission ready is an even bigger logistical challenge that demands 
innovation and the ability to deal with the unexpected--an ability gained through 
experience.  With limited funding and resources available, knowledge management (KM) 
is the leverage by which the Marine Corps can capitalize on its prior experiences and 
bring to bear an arsenal of expertise that will better support the mission commander.   
Contingency contracting is a key aspect to supporting Marine Corps deployed 
forces.  Becoming well versed in federal contract law, practices, and methods requires a 
sizeable investment in schooling, on-the-job training, and money.  The Marine Corps 
utilizes both officers and enlisted personnel in its contracting force.  Marine Corps 
contingency contracting officers attend an eighteen-month acquisition and contracting 
curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) located in Monterey, CA.  It is at 
NPS that a solid foundation of acquisition, contracting, and business acumen is instilled 
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into future Marine Corps contracting officers.  This education is further enhanced with 
the real- life experiences gained by Marine Corps contracting officers during their four-
year payback tour (spending three years in the field contracting structure and one year 
back in the Fleet Marine Force) after they leave NPS.  After their payback tour is 
completed, contracting officers are then reassigned to the operational forces in their 
primary military occupational specialty (e.g., infantry, supply, aviation).  Currently, no 
career path in the acquisition and contracting field exists for Marine Corps contracting 
officers (Corcoran, 2000).   
Enlisted personnel are selected after a Regional Contracting Officer (RCO) 
interviews them and makes a favorable recommendation to their entry into the 
contracting field. The majority of education for the enlisted personnel comes from on-
the-job training and basic contracting classes.  Enlisted personnel lack a formalized 
educational track and attend contracting courses when their budgets and schedules 
permit.  Unlike contracting officers, enlisted Marines will remain in the contracting force 
for the remainder of their careers in the Marine Corps.    
When contracting officers and enlisted contracting personnel leave the contracting 
field (e.g., retirement, attend career level school commensurate with their rank, recruiting 
duty, drill field duty), they take with them a wealth of information, experience, and 
wisdom.  Operating in an environment that is characterized by change, the Marine Corps 
is loosing a vital asset to its ability to effectively support its deployed forces: “An 
organization relies on its memory for maintaining continuity in a changing environment” 
(Nissen, Kamel, and Sengupta, 2000).  In essence, valuable lessons learned and practical 
experiences are being lost.  Capturing these valuable lessons learned and structuring a 
  3 
knowledge management system that serves not as a repository of data, but one of 
knowledge sharing, generation, and retention, is the challenge.    
B. GOAL OF THESIS 
The goal of this thesis is to serve as an implementation guide for the application 
of a knowledge management system (KMS) to support the Marine Corps contingency 
contracting process.   
C. SCOPE OF THESIS 
An evaluation is conducted to assess how a knowledge management system can 
be designed for Marine Corps contingency contracting and the potential benefits and 
drawbacks that such an endeavor would include.  A requirements assessment is 
conducted to identify the users and define what information and knowledge requirements 
are needed.  Lastly, an examination of current successful government and corporate 
knowledge management systems is conducted in order to understand how such systems 
work in practice.   
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question is: how can knowledge management be 
implemented to improve the Marine Corps contingency contracting practice by 
incentivizing knowledge sharing, generation and retention? In order to answer this 
primary question, several subsidiary questions need to be addressed: 
 
· What is knowledge management?  
 
· What is the current method of knowledge sharing in the Marine Corps contingency 
contracting process?  
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· What knowledge is needed? When? By whom? 
 
· How can the required contingency contracting knowledge be effectively captured, 
distributed and applied? 
 
· What measures of performance are required to evaluate successful knowledge 
transfer? 
 
· What tools are required to incentivize the implementation of knowledge management 
in Marine Corps contingency contracting? 
 
· How can the results of this investigation be generalized to other ongoing actions and 
processes? 
 
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this thesis research consists of the following steps: 
· Conduct a comprehensive literature review of knowledge management to include: 
books, magazines, reports from industry leaders, and credible Internet based sources.  
 
· Review the current Marine Corps contingency contracting knowledge management 
practices and applicable publications. 
 
· Conduct interviews, either in person or by telephone, with Marine Corps contingency 
contracting personnel and senior contracting officials at Headquarters, Marine Corps 
(HQMC), Washington, D.C., Camp Lejune, North Carolina, Camp Pendleton, 
California, Camp Butler, Okinawa and other Department of Defense (DoD) 
commands to ascertain the knowledge requirements of the users.  
 
· Use a KM framework to analyze and redesign the process of knowledge transfer 
within the Marine Corps contingency contracting organization. 
 
F.  ASSUMPTIONS 
It is assumed throughout this thesis that the reader has a basic understanding of 
the general organization of the Marine Corps.  It is also assumed that the reader has a 
basic understanding of contracting procedures and regulations of the Federal Acquisition 
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This thesis is not intended to be a comparison of the various military services’ 
knowledge management systems nor is it intended to be a technical guide for setting up a 
knowledge management site. These topics are beyond the scope and intent of this thesis.    
Instead, the author seeks to advance a conceptual framework in which the practice of KM 
can be applied to Marine Corps contingency contracting and hopefully, serve as a model 
to other fields within the Marine Corps and military services.    
H. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
This thesis is organized as follows.  Chapter II provides background information 
on knowledge management, Marine Corps contracting structure and organization, and the 
structure and organization of contingency contracting in the Marine Corps. Chapter III 
discusses the current practice of KM in Marine Corps contingency contracting.  Chapter 
IV innovates Marine Corps contingency contracting knowledge sharing through KM.  
Chapter V provides conclusions, recommendations, and future research topics.   
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II. BACKGROUND 
Chapter II provides background information on knowledge management (KM) and 
the mission of the Marine Corps’ contracting force and its structure.  
A.  KNOWLEDGE 
In the 1990’s, the concept of knowledge management emerged explosively in the 
business community.  Although knowledge is not new and has been around for centuries 
(Davenport and Prusak 1998, Brooking 1999), companies are realizing that their 
competitive edge is mostly the brainpower or intellectual capital of their employees and 
management (Liebowitz 1999).  Nissen, Kamel and Sengupta (2000) state:   
The Power of knowledge has long been ascribed to successful individuals 
in the organization, but today it is recognized and pursued at the enterprise 
level through a practice known as knowledge management (see Davenport 
and Prusak 1998).  Although knowledge management has been 
investigated in the context of decision support systems (DSS) and expert 
systems (ES) for over a decade (e.g., see Shen 1987), interest in and 
attention to this topic have exploded recently.  For example, knowledge 
capital is commonly discussed as a factor of no less importance than the 
traditional economic inputs of labor and finance (Forbes 1997), and the 
concept knowledge equity is now receiving theoretical treatment through 
research (e.g., see Glazer 1998).    
 
Many practitioners in different fields attest to the advantage of embracing 
knowledge management.  Private corporations such as Ford, Chrysler, Amoco, Dow, 
GM, Monsanto, Columbia/Healthcare, and Texas Instruments have all experimented with 
KM and are reportedly benefiting from the outcomes (Srikantaiah and Koenig, 1999).  Of 
particular note is British Petroleum (BP).  John Browne, BP’s Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO), has been the force behind a KM initiative that has transformed the once 
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financially strapped company into the most profitable of all major oil companies 
(Prokesch 1997).  The reason for this has been in large part Browne’s recognition of the 
intellectual power that existed within his company, but was not being utilized to create a 
synergistic atmosphere within BP.  Browne states:   
No matter where the knowledge comes from, the key to reaping a big 
return is to leverage that knowledge by replicating it throughout the 
company so that each unit is not learning in isolation and reinventing the 
wheel again and again. (Prokesch 1997) 
 
While the business community has embraced KM and profited from it, the United 
States Marine Corps has not fully committed to this practice.  This is especially apparent 
in its contracting force.  Marine Corps contracting is plagued by the lack of a career path 
for its contracting officers and too few enlisted personnel.  This has prevented the 
contracting force from acquiring a solid contracting knowledge base.  With this said, the 
Marine Corps contracting force is the ideal place to implement a KM program to capture, 
preserve and utilize its detailed contracting knowledge. 
1. Knowledge Management (KM) 
Because KM is a new discipline, the degree of interest, the view, and the 
interpretation of KM vary among practitioners.  These different interpretations depend on 
their environment and are reflected in their professional literatures and in the content of 
professional conventions. (Srikantaiah and Koenig 1999)  The following KM definitions 
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Practitioner KM Definition 
Wiig 
KM is the systematic, explicit, and deliberate building, renewal, 
and application of knowledge to maximize an enterprise’s knowledge-
related effectiveness and returns from its knowledge assets.   
Hibbard 
KM is the process of capturing a company’s collective expertise 
wherever it resides – in databases, on paper, or in people’s heads – and 
distributing it to wherever it can help produce the biggest payoff. 
Petrash KM is getting the right knowledge to the right people at the right time so they can make the best decision. 
Macintosh 
KM involves the identification and analysis of available and 
required knowledge, and the subsequent planning and control of 
actions to develop knowledge assets to as to fulfill organization 
objectives. 
O’Dell KM applies systematic approaches to find, understand, and use 
knowledge to create value.   
Van der 
Spek 
KM is the explicit control and management of knowledge within an 
organization aimed at achieving the company’s objectives. 
Beckman 
KM is the formalization of and access to experience, knowledge, 
and expertise that create new capabilities, enable superior performance, 
encourage innovation, and enhance customer value. 
 
Table 2.1 KM Practitioners and Definitions 
(From Liebowitz 1999) 
 
Srikantaiah and Koenig (1999) identify three central themes that dominate the 
field of KM as discovered through communications with field specialists and surveys of 
professional literature.  These themes are:  organizational learning, document 
management and technology.  Organizational Learning emphasizes that the efficiency 
and effectiveness of knowledge workers depends mostly on how workers communicate 
and collaborate in their efforts and expose themselves to communities of practice within 
the institution as well as outside the institution.  Document management specialists utilize 
libraries, information centers, record centers, and other document-based resources.   They 
believe that the effectiveness of these information systems relies on factors like response 
time, throughput, quality of information, accuracy of information, completeness of 
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information, relevancy of information, and operating costs.  The focus for these 
specialists is on the explicit knowledge component.  Technology experts view KM with 
systems analysis, design and implementation in mind.  This approach may emphasize one 
or several of the following areas:  knowledge storage and access  “push” and “pull” 
approaches, networks, and institutional culture.   
To make KM effective, bringing explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge together 
in an infrastructure is absolutely essential (Srikantaiah and Koenig 1999).  Explicit 
knowledge is codified knowledge, and is transmittable in formal, systematic language 
(Nonaka et al., 1996).   Figure 2.1 depicts some of the sources of explicit knowledge and 
its various forms.  Tacit knowledge is informal, accessible only through knowledge 
elicitation in observation of behavior (Liebowitz 1999).  It is developed and internalized 
by the knower over a long period of time and almost impossible to reproduce in a 
document or database (Davenport and Prusak 1999).  Figure 2.2 depicts sources of tacit 


























Figure 2.1 Explicit Knowledge: Forms  
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Figure 2.2 Tacit Knowledge   
(After Srikantaiah and Koenig, 1999) 
 
Although KM is the latest management discipline, many are discovering that 
managing corporate knowledge is difficult (Davenport 1995).  One reason for this is that 
knowledge is tacit and unstructured (Nonaka 1994), which in turn makes knowledge 
acquisition and application difficult.  Additionally, information technology (IT) 
employed to enable knowledge work targets data and information, not knowledge 
(Ruggles 1997).  Nissen, Kamel and Sengupta (2000) believe that this contributes to 
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2.  Knowledge Hierarchy 
According to knowledge experts, knowledge can be organized into a hierarchy.  
The basic components of this hierarchy are data, information and knowledge.  Davenport 
and Prusak (1998) discuss how a misunderstanding of these terms has resulted in the 
failure of many KM programs:   
Confusion about what data, information and knowledge are--how they 
differ, what those words mean--has resulted in enormous expenditures on 
technology initiatives that rarely deliver what the firms spending the 
money needed or thought they were getting.  Often firms don’t understand 
what they need until they invest heavily in a system that fails to provide it.   
 
With this said, the following definitions from Davenport and Prusak are provided: 
Data is a set of discrete, objective facts about events.  In an organizational context, data is 
most usefully described as structured records of transactions.  Information is a message, 
usually in the form of a document or an audible or visible communication.  It has a sender 
and a receiver.  Information is meant to change the way the receiver perceives something, 
to have an impact on his judgment.  According to Peter Drucker, information is “data 
endowed with relevance and purpose” (Davenport and Prusak 1998).  Knowledge is a 
fluid mix of framed experience, values, contextual information, and expert insight that 
provides a framework for evaluating and incorporating new experiences and information.  
It originates and is applied in the minds of knowers.  In organizations, it often becomes 
embedded not only in documents or repositories but also in organizational routines, 
processes, practices, and norms.  Figure 2.3 is a combination of Alter’s and Tobin’s 
knowledge hierarchy models and illustrates how data becomes knowledge.   
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Figure 2.3 Evolution of Knowledge 
(After Tobin 1996 and Atler 1996) 
 
3.  KM Life Cycle 
KM can be described in terms of attributes that flow through a structured process 
or life cycle, which begins at its conception or creation, and continues until it has evolved 
into a useful state of sharing and application.  There are many different KM life cycles 
(KMLC).  Table 2.2 outlines the KMLCs proposed by several KM experts (Nissen1999, 
Despres and Chauvel 1999, Gartner Group 1999, Davenport and Prusak 1998).  Although 
differences do exist, the four models are similar.  In the amalgamated model, the phases 
of the KMLC are:  create, capture, formalize, distribute, apply, and evolve.     
 
Model Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 6 






Transfer Reuse Evolve 
Gartner 
Group 
Create Organize Capture Access Use  
Davenport 
and Prusak Generate  Codify Transfer   
Amalgamated Create Organize Formalize Distribute Apply Evolve 
Table 2.2 Knowledge management Life Cycle Models 
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Phase 1, create, is the discovery and development of new knowledge (Despres 
and Chavel 1999, Gartner Group 1999).  Phase 2, organize, involves organizing, mapping 
or bundling of knowledge (Nissen 1999, Gartner Group 1999).  Phase 3, formalize, 
concentrates on making knowledge explicit (Nissen 1999).  Phase 4, distribute, is the 
ability to share knowledge (Nissen 1999).  Phase 5, apply, is the ability to use the 
knowledge in the organization (Nissen 1999).  Phase 6, evolve, is the refinement and 
continual development of existing knowledge (Despres and Chauvel 1999).   
4.  KM Design Process 
Nissen, Kamel and Sengupta (2000) focus on knowledge management and system 
design from three integrated perspectives:  1) re-engineering process innovation, 2) 
expert systems knowledge acquisition and representation, and 3) information systems 
analysis and design.  They integrate these three perspectives in a systematic manner, 
beginning with analysis and design of the enterprise process of interest, progressively 
moving into knowledge capture and formalization, and then system design and 
implementation.  The four steps that are used in the Nissen, Kamel, and Sengupta model 
are:  1) process analysis, 2) knowledge analysis, 3) context analysis, and 4) system 
analysis.  By using this integrated methodology, one can identify, select, compose, and 
integrate the many component applications and technologies required for effective 
knowledge system and process design (Nissen, Kamel, and Sengupta 2000).   
a.  Process Analysis 
Process analysis requires a thorough understanding of an enterprise’s 
objectives and strategies.  This generally entails modeling and analysis that results in one 
or more (re)designs for the process in question.  The process, along with its various 
  16 
redesign opportunities and required knowledge, must be understood first before designing 
systems.  Although many methodologies have been developed for process (re)design, 
Nissen’s measurement-driven redesign knowledge system “KOPeR”, which 
automatically diagnoses process pathologies and recommends redesign transformations 
(Nissen, Kamel, Sengupta 2000), is used in this thesis. 
b. Knowledge Analysis 
Knowledge analysis is mutually dependent on process analysis and 
directly fed by the process analysis results (Nissen, Kamel, Sengupta 2000).  Prior to 
conducting knowledge analysis, the organization’s mission and goal must be fully 
understood.  Knowledge analysis involves identifying key knowledge within an 
organization.  Knowledge analysis results in a thorough understanding of critical success 
factors (CSF) and identifies the key explicit and tacit knowledge employed to make 
decisions and take action.  CSFs are the key factors that must be addressed to ensure the 
thorough implementation of a KM program. 
c. Context Analysis 
Context analysis focuses on the context surrounding two primary factors, 
the organization and the knowledge underlying the task (Nissen, Kamel, Sengupta 2000).  
In addressing contextual factors associated with the organization, the role of the 
organizational memory, its structure, and organizational incentives are the focus.  
Regarding the task-related knowledge, the practices organizations employ to codify or 
make explicit, is the focus. 
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d. Systems Analysis 
In system analysis, the organization’s current procedures and information 
systems used to perform organizational tasks are analyzed.  The system analysis phase is 
identical to the analysis and design phases of the system development life cycle (SDLC).  
In the analysis phase, system requirements are determined principally from the steps 
above, and an alternate system design(s) is derived to match the system requirements.  
The output of the analysis phase is a description of the alternative solution.  During the 
design phase, the description of the new or enhanced system is designed meeting the new 
system requirements (Hoffer, George, Valacich 1998). 
B. USMC CONTRACTING  
1.  Mission 
As stated in the United States Marine Corps Contracts Campaign Plan (2001), the 
mission of the contracting community is directly tied to the readiness of the Marine Air 
Ground Task Force (MAGTF) by providing the expertise to acquire best value goods and 
services, whenever and wherever the mission of the Marine Corps is executed. 
Marine Corps contracting personnel are specially trained Marines that possess the 
ability to operate independently, as is the case in contingency operations, anywhere in 
the world.  With the diversity of missions that the Marine Corps is increasingly 
becoming involved with, from humanitarian relief operations to peace keeping efforts, 
Marine Corps contracting personnel serve as key logistical force multipliers to the 
operational commander.   
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2. Purchasing and Contracting Specialist, Military Occupational Specialty 
(MOS) 3044  
 
Enlisted Marines are selected after a Regional Contracting Officer (RCO) 
interviews them and makes a favorable recommendation to their entry into the 
contracting field.  The RCO screens the Marine in conjunction with the criteria of the 
MOS manual and conducts a review of the Marine’s service record book (SRB) to check 
for any disciplinary and/or personal problems that would preclude the Marine from 
qualifying as a 3044.  The MOS 3044 sponsor (the Procurement Chief of the Marine 
Corps) approves all nominations of 3044 Marines.  Marines enter the contracting field via 
a lateral move process.  The minimum requirement is a Sergeant with not more than two 
years in grade.  Corporals may be selected pending the discretion of the MOS sponsor.  
Once a Marine is selected for the 3044 MOS, his MOS is temporarily changed to a basic 
MOS 3000 classification.  From this point, the Marine must complete either a six-month 
period of on-the-job training (OJT) or attend the Defense Acquisition University’s 
(DAU) course in Contracting Fundamentals (CON 101).  Additionally, the RCO, who is 
responsible for providing the Marine with OJT, must give a positive endorsement as to 
whether the Marine’s MOS should be changed to a 3044.  After this process is complete, 
the Marine reports to a regional contracting office for a two-year training cycle.  Per the 
MOS manual, this two-year training period serves as a probation period.  If the Marine’s 
performance is acceptable, he is allowed to remain a 3044.  If not, than the Marine reverts 
back to his original MOS.  It is important to note that there is no detailed educational path 
for enlisted contracting Marines, save for the aforementioned courses and probation 
period.  However, enlisted Marines do have the opportunity to attend DAU courses 
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(pending availability of funding and operational commitments) and earn up to a level 
three DAU certification.  Currently, only two of the 127 enlisted Marines in the Marine 
Corps possess this level of certification. (Brown, H. 2001) 
a. Career Path 
During the Marines’ first two years, the probation period, they are not 
deployed to the Fleet Service Support Groups (FSSG).  The new 3044 may be deployed 
as an assistant to a more experienced 3044 or contingency contracting officer to gain 
working knowledge and experience.  After the two-year probation period is complete, the 
Marine than serves a tour at one of the FSSGs.  Upon completion of this FSSG tour, the 
Marine is transferred to a different contracting office according to the needs of the 
Marine Corps.  All 3044s will remain in the contracting field for the rest of their careers 
as Marines.  All Staff Sergeants and above are still obligated to serve in special billets 
such as drill instructor and recruiter, and attend Staff Non-Commissioned Officer degree 
completion programs commensurate with their ranks.  (Brown, H. 2001). 
b. 3044 Table of Organization (T/O) 
Marine enlisted personnel are assigned to all regional contracting offices 
and limited contracting offices.  The table of organization (T/O) for enlisted contracting 
Marines in the Marine Corps is 127.  Currently, there are 124 enlisted contracting 
Marines (number includes those Marines on B-billets, medical and non-deployable 
status).  Table 2.3 provides a listing of the contracting offices where enlisted Marines are 
stationed.   
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Command Location Command Location 
HQMC(LBO) 
ANNEX 









Washington, D.C. CAMP SMITH Hawaii 





North Carolina 1FSSG CAMPPEN California 
MCB CAMP 
PENDLETON 









MCRD PARRIS IL. South Carolina MARFORSOUTH Florida 






















Table 2.3 List of USMC Enlisted Contracting Locations  
3. Marine Corps Contracting Officer – MOS 9656  
Several major laws and policies govern Marine Corps contracting.  These are 
Title 10 of the U.S. Code, DoD Instruction 5000.52M and Secretary of the Navy 
Instruction 5300.36 (Cocoran, 2000).  The most prominent of these is Title 10 of the U.S. 
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Code, which lists the qualifications required of military personnel who are to serve in the 
capacity of a contracting officer.  These requirements state that a person must: 
· Have completed all mandatory contracting courses required for a 
contracting officer at the grade level that the person is serving in; 
 
· Have at least two years of experience in a contracting position; 
 
· Have received a baccalaureate degree from an accredited institution 
authorized to grant baccalaureate degrees and have completed at least 24 
semester credit hours (or the equivalent) of study from an accredited 
institution of higher education in any of the following disciplines: 
accounting, business finance, law, contracts, purchasing, economics, 
industrial management, marketing, quantitative methods, and organization 
and management; 
 
· Meet such additional requirements, based on the dollar value and the 
complexity of the contracts awarded or administered in the position, as 
may be established by the Secretary of Defense for the position. (Title 10 
U.S. Code, Sec 1724) 
 
a.  Naval Postgraduate School  
In keeping with the stringent requirements demanded by law and policy to 
become a military contracting officer, the Marine Corps starts its future contracting 
officers off with a solid education in acquisition and contracting at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS), in Monterey, California.  Assignment to NPS is outlined in 
the Marine Corps Order (MCO) 1520.9F that identifies specialized billets that are to be 
filled under the Special Education Program (SEP).   
The Acquisition and Contract Management curriculum, curriculum 
number 815, is a demanding six-quarter (eighteen-month) course of study.  This 
curriculum is comprised of over 960 hours of classroom instruction in subjects such as 
financial accounting, economics for defense managers, managerial communication, 
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mathematics, information technology, principles of acquisition and contract management, 
microeconomic theory, management accounting, statistical analysis for management, 
contract pricing and negotiations, contract law, organization and management, strategy 
and policy, contract administration, contracting for major systems, and acquisition and 
contracting policy.   Additionally, the 815 curriculum is enhanced with a weekly seminar 
that brings in working contracting professionals and agency heads to discuss current 
contracting and program management issues.  Seminars also serve in the added role of 
catalysts for thesis topic development.   A master’s thesis serves as the capstone of the 
formal education received by Marine Corps officers at NPS.   
Upon successful completion of the 815 curriculum, Marine Corps officers 
are assigned a secondary MOS of 9656, Contracting Officer, and are DAWIA Level II 
certified.   Table 2.4 provides the locations where USMC contracting officer billets are 
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Title Grade Command Location 
Contracting Officer  Major 





Contracting Officer  Major 





Officer  Major 













Marine Corps Base  
Camp Pendleton California 
Regional Contracting 
Officer Major Marine Corps Support Activity Missouri 
Contracting Officer Major 
Marine Corps Systems 
Command 
Virginia 
Contracting Officer  Major Marine Corps Logistics Base Georgia 
Contracting Officer Major 
Advanced Amphibious Assault 
Vehicle Program Office 
Virginia 
Regional Contracting 
Officer  Captain Marine Corps Base 29 Palms  California 
Regional Contracting 





Captain MCRD San Diego California 
Regional Contracting 
Officer Captain MARFORRES Louisiana 
Contracting Officer Captain Blount Island Command Florida 
Contingency 
Contracting Officer  Captain 1
st FSSG California 
Contingency 






Captain 3rd FSSG 
Okinawa, 
Japan 
Contracting Officer  Major I MEF California 




Table 2.4 List of USMC Officer Contracting Billets  
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b.  Payback Tour 
After graduating from NPS, the Marine Corps officer is obligated to a 
four-year payback tour.  Three of these years are spent in the field contracting structure 
and the final year is spent back in the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) (MARCORSEPMAN 
PARS 2003 and 5002).  Under the direction of the Marine Corps Installations and 
Logistics Department, the billets available for contracting officers fall into three general 
groups (Cocoran, 2000):   
· The policy billets, which are located at HQMC, provide guidance and direction on 
policies; 
 
· The field contracting billets, which are located at the logistics bases, recruit 
depots and three major Marine Corps Bases (Camp Pendleton, Camp Lejune and 
Okinawa), that provide all contracting services for their respective mission areas; 
 
· The contingency contracting billets, which are located in the Force Service 
Support Groups at the three major bases mentioned above, that provide 
contracting support to forces deployed. 
 
It is important to note at this time that the current organizational design 
does not provide Marine Corps contracting officer billets at major buying commands:  
DoN, the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and other DoD organizations 
(Cocoran, 2000).    At the completion of the payback tour, the contracting officer returns 
to his primary MOS in the FMF. This seems counter- intuitive given the fact that the 
contracting officer has been out of his primary MOS for approximately five years and 
undoubtedly has lost proficiency in his primary MOS.  By returning to the FMF, the 
detailed skills and experience that the officer acquired as a contracting officer will perish 
with time.  In his thesis, Corcoran (2000) has found that approximately 70% of 
contracting officers will leave the Marine Corps upon completion of their payback tour. 
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This high turnover rate of contracting officers, coupled with the high percentage of 
contracting officers leaving the service after their payback tour is depriving the Marine 
Corps of a corporate contracting knowledge base.  This lack of a corporate knowledge 
base directly impacts the ability of the Marine Corps to perform its mission and 
underscores the necessity to implement an effective KM system.   
4. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING  
a. Introduction 
Contingency contracting differs from the normal contracting process in 
that the CCM is operating independently or is assigned to a joint contracting cell.  The 
contingency environment is often times one that is removed from a traditional support 
infrastructure (e.g., communications, IT support, transportation).  Additionally, common 
contracting practices are waived or altered depending upon the classification of the 
contingency and characteristics of the operating environment (e.g., cash only, security 
posture, NATO regulations).  It is imperative that CCMs be capable and highly 
knowledgeable contracting individuals who can procure bulk materials and supplies 
locally to support the operation and prevent the waste of scarce lift resources and 
funding.  The Marine Corps Purchasing Procedures Manual (MCPPM), Appendix B 
states: 
The contingency or low intensity operation will most likely occur in areas 
of the world where little or no Host Nation Support (HNS) agreements 
exist. Thus, the requirement for contracting/purchasing support becomes a 
question of accumulating as much data regarding source availability and 
the location as quickly as possible.  The contracting team must accomplish 
this amassing of available local resources to offset not only the immediate 
needs of the U.S. Forces (e.g., bulk class III, class IV, shelters, 
construction materials, miscellaneous supplies, and services) but also 
establish support relationships with the local authorities that would serve 
as a basis for firmer commitments if required. 
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Additionally, as stated in the MCPPM, the mission of Marine Corps 
contingency contracting is: 
· To locate and obtain resources through contracting and purchasing actions which 
will legally support U.S. Marine Corps mission requirements in a theater of 
operations. 
· To initiate and execute contracting/purchasing actions with local resource 
activities to provide required and authorized combat support and combat service 
support. 
· To serve as an initial focal point to manage and coordinate available HNS 
resources obtained to support the deployed forces and to interface HNS plans, 
resources, and activities within the overall support structure. 
Due to the high level of importance that contingency contracting plays in 
Marine Corps doctrine, the author has chosen this area as the focus of this thesis.   
b.  Organizational Structure 
Marine Corps contingency contracting falls under the Assistant Branch 
Head for Policy and Oversight, Contracts Division, Installation and Logistics, Head 
Quarters Marine Corps (HQMC (LBO)).  One of the two contracting officers that are 
assigned to HQMC(LBO) is designated as the USMC Contingency Contracting Officer.  
Two of the three Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs) have a billet for a contingency 
contracting officer with the rank of Major.  These individuals are mostly responsible for 
planning MEF level deployments and joint operations. (McMillon 2000)  The Marine 
Corps maintains contingency contracting offices within Marine Forces South 
(MARFORSOUTH) and Marine Forces Europe (MARFOREUR).  These billets are filled 
by senior enlisted personnel and provide local contracting support to their respective 
headquarters and limited liaison with other Marine Corps units within their region. 
(McMillon 2000) 
  27 
The Marine Corps contingency contracting offices are located within the 
three FSSGs – Camp Lejune, North Carolina; Camp Pendleton, California and Camp 
Butler, Okinawa.  These contingency contracting offices are headed by either a Captain 
or a Major and rate a T/O of one Gunnery Sergeant, two Staff Sergeants, and five 
Sergeants.  These contingency contracting offices support their respective Marine 
Expeditionary Units (MEUs) while they are deployed.  However, Fleet Service Support 
Groups (FSSG) differ in their staffing procedures.  For instance, 2nd FSSG (Camp Lejune, 
North Carolina) attach their enlisted and/or officer contracting personnel to the MEUs for 
the duration of the deployment while the 1st FSSG (Camp Pendleton, California) and 3rd 
FSSG (Camp Butler, Okinawa) do not.  The 1st FSSG and the 3rd FSSG support major 
exercises like Cobra Gold in Thailand and Tandem Thrust in Australia.   
c.  Operating Environment  
Contingency contracting personnel operate in many diverse and often 
times, troubled areas of the world.  Deployments to the Persian Gulf, Somalia, and more 
recently Kosovo, highlight the challenges that contingency contracting personnel face in 
satisfying logistical requirements for the forces they support.  These services include 
everything from acquiring fresh baked bread to twenty-five ton cranes (Arias, Mrak, 
2001).  This often requires that the contingency contracting personnel go out into the 
local communities, whether they are in a friendly or hostile environment, to seek out 
vendors who can deliver the required goods and/or services.  What complicates the 
situation is that contingency operations are most often conducted in an immature 
environment that lacks the infrastructure that supports communications, Internet access 
and basic office administrative functions.  This immature environment, coupled with the 
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fact that contingency contracting personnel often operate independently, warrants that the 
contingency contracting Marine is well equipped to carryout his duties.  Additionally, this 
is the critical time where knowledge is gathered by the  Marine as to who the venders are, 
what the operating environment is like, what are the security concerns, what services and 
goods can be procured locally and which ones cannot. 
The aforementioned items comprise the first level of knowledge that is 
generated by the contingency contracting Marine.  Effectively utilizing this knowledge is 
vital not only for the current operation, but also for follow-on personnel who will find 
themselves in the same area of operations (AO) or be confronted with a like situation in 
the future.  Therefore, the very nature of contingency contracting warrants a KMS that 
addresses its specialized needs.   
C. SUMMARY 
Corporations have recognized the advantage of properly managing the knowledge 
that is possessed by their workforce.  By establishing a KMS to capture, maintain and 
utilize this knowledge, corporations gain a competitive edge over their competition and 
operate in a more efficient manner.  Private corporations utilizing KMS serve as an 
example to how and why the Marine Corps contingency contracting force needs to 
implement an effective KMS.  The unique operating environments that contingency 
contractors operate in demand a KMS system that is capable capturing knowledge and 
establishing a solid corporate knowledge base for the rest of the contingency contracting 
force.   
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III. KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT IN MARINE CORPS 
CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING  
 
Chapter III describes the current environment of KM in contingency contracting. 
It also utilizes the KM design approach of Nissen, Kamel, and Sengupta to analyze the 
current KM environment and makes recommendations for improvement based on the 
pathologies associated with these practices.   
A. CURRENT KM PRACTICE IN MARINE CORPS CONTINGENCY 
CONTRACTING 
Currently, there is no standard operating procedure (SOP) from HQMC(LBO) 
that mandates how KM should be conducted, if at all, in the contingency contracting 
force.  Rather, KM is left to the initiative of the individual unit and CCM without any 
synergistic cooperation between commands.  At the organizational level, HQMC(LBO) 
has established a KM site called K-21.  However, K-21 is not used by its intended 
audience as a KM site and therefore, it is ineffective as such.  
At the unit level, individual contingency contracting offices have their own SOPs 
and practices regarding KM.  In general, these contingency contracting offices maintain 
hard copies of after-action reports (AARs) and copies of previously used contracts in 
binders.  Although all units do have some type of KMS, making contributions to it  (e.g., 
in the form of AARs after each deployment/exercise, lessons learned, vender lists) and 
keeping it updated is not a mandated requirement.   
The individual level is the place where the most effective means of KM is 
conducted in contingency contracting.  For it is at this level that the CCM acquires the 
specialized knowledge necessary to function effectively in the operating environment.  
For example, the CCM generates listings of vendors in the area and what services/goods 
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they are able to provide.  Additionally, the CCM acquires an intimate working knowledge 
about the environment, financial/funding points of contact, operational requirements, 
communication and IT infrastructure and capabilities, transportation capabilities, and 
limitations, and other factors.  In short, the CCM becomes a logistical resident expert on 
the operation.   
Over time, CCMs accumulate an impressive amount of knowledge on exercises 
and the contracting environment in various places around the world.  This knowledge is 
maintained by the individual CCM in the form of journals, Emails, electronic documents, 
paper copies of vendor lists, and most recently, on handheld Palm Pilot computers.  Palm 
Pilots have provided CCMs with a greater amount of flexibility and capability, in not 
only executing their duties as contingency contractors, but also in capturing, storing, and 
sharing the knowledge they acquire.  An example of this is provided by the CCMs at 
Camp Pendleton.  Rotating every few months in support of an exercise in Africa, the 
CCMs were not being afforded much time to conduct a thorough turnover.  However, the 
CCM who rotated back to the States was able to share a large amount of knowledge and 
information concerning vendor listings, operational requirements, and operational 
environment simply by beaming the information from his Palm Pilot to the Palm Pilot 
(via the infra-red port) of his replacement.   
Another example of this is found at Camp Lejune where the contingency 
contracting officer purchased a digital camera.  This digital camera was used to great 
effect in documenting the condition of rental cars acquired from a vendor in Greece.  
When the time came to return the vehicles, the photographs were used to dispel claims by 
the vendor as to the original condition of the automobiles.   
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What makes these examples all the more impressive is that the Palm Pilots and 
digital cameras were not provided by HQMC as tools for job improvement or KM.  
Instead, in an effort to better equip their CCMs, contracting offices purchased the 
equipment themselves.  This illustrates two points.  First, that the different contracting 
commands are using their initiative to acquire available commercial off the shelf (COTS) 
technology to better equip their CCMs. Secondly, there is no organizational support from 
HQMC in providing the tools or oversight necessary for increased job performance of 
CCMs and leveraging the knowledge that they are acquiring.   
B. KM DESIGN PROCESS 
1. Introduction 
Due to the current state of KM in Marine Corps contingency contracting, key 
knowledge is not being retained, shared or generated amongst its practitioners.  In this 
section, the author identifies a target process for analysis through research and applies 
Nissen, Kamel and Sengupta’s KM design process to improve CCM performance.   
2. Research 
All three contingency contracting offices in the Marine Corps are contacted for 
their perspectives and input regarding KM.  Interviews are conducted in person with 
CCMs from Camp Pendleton and Camp Lejune.  Personal interviews are also conducted 
with personnel from HQMC(LBO).  Email is used to correspond with the contingency 
contracting officer in Okinawa, Japan, as it is with all those who were interviewed.    
The objectives of the research was to identify the following key points: 
· Identify how KM is currently conducted within contingency contracting. 
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· Identify critical knowledge/information requirements--what is needed by whom 
and when? 
· Identify critical decision processes. 
· Identify who possesses knowledge and expertise. 
· Identify how knowledge is acquired in contingency contracting. 
· Identify how knowledge is shared within contingency contracting. 
 
In conducting research, two themes become prominent:  the need for CCMs to 
have a mastery of the deployed contingency contracting process (DCCP) and a thorough 
understanding of the working relationships between all interested parties in the 
contingency environment  (e.g., Commanding Officer, end-user, veterinarian, finance 
personnel, CCM).  Marines Corps contingency contracting appears particularly well-
suited for KM, because the large amount of tacit experience required of each CCM to 
perform their duties varies greatly, both over time and throughout the organization.  
Although formal education is superb for the officers and available to the enlisted CCMs, 
considerable experience and OJT is required to master the DCCP.  As the research shows, 
the knowledge and experience in contingency contracting resides within a few 
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3. Process Analysis 
Drawing from the integrated methodology of Nissen, Kamel, and Sengupta 
(2000), the first step is process analysis.  This high- level analysis occurs in two 
increments.  The first increment involves a redesign analysis that is customary in re-
engineering engagements.  This type of redesign analysis focuses on work-process flows 
that are called horizontal processes, because their representations are usually depicted as 
directed graphs, with process activities running horizontally across the page.   The first 
increment of this analysis provides guidance for the (re)design process (e.g., to overcome 
process pathologies).  The second increment involves KM aspects of the targeted process.  
This KM analysis focuses on cross-process flows that are called vertical processes.  
Vertical process representations are also generally depicted as directed graphs and run 
vertically down the page, across the kinds of work-process flows (e.g., horizontal 
processes) being examined. (Nissen and Espino 2000)  This thesis uses Nissen’s 
measurement-driven redesign knowledge system, KOPeR, which automatically diagnoses 
process pathologies and recommends redesign transformations (Nissen, Kamel, and 
Sengupta 2000). Nissen (1998) describes re-engineering in terms of process-redesign 
activities organized as an evolutionary spiral to denote increasing process knowledge and 
understanding as the re-engineering activity progresses.  This sequence is denoted in 
Figure 3.1.  Step one is to identify a target process for redesign.  Next, a model is 
constructed to represent the baseline (i.e., “as is”) configuration of this process, and 
configuration measurements then drive the diagnosis of process pathologies.  The 
diagnostic results are used in turn to match the appropriate redesign transformations 
available to “treat” pathologies that are detected.  This sequence of analytical activities 
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leads systematically to the generation of one or more redesign alternatives, which most 
experts argue should be tested through some mechanism (e.g., simulation) prior to 













Figure 3.1 General Redesign Process 
(After Nissen, Kamel and Sengupta 2000) 
 
The process targeted for redesign in this thesis is the DCCP due to its importance 
in supporting deployed Marine forces.  This process is derived from MCO 4200.15F, 
Appendix B, Section 4:  Duties and Responsibilities.  Although this section outlines the 
duties that are expected of contingency contracting officers, it is used as a model for both 
officer and enlisted CCMs involved in the DCCP for the purposes of this thesis.  The 
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Process A B C D 
Task Assign CCM Pre -Deployment Prep Rpt to Unit Submission Reqs  
Agent CCO CCM CCM User 
Organ FSSG FSSG C-Cell  Various 
IT-S - Internet - - 
IT-C - Emails - - 
IT-A - - - _ 




Process E F G H 
Task Est. CC Office  Purch G/S/S  Pay for G/S/S  Monit Audit Trail 
Agent CCM CCM DISBO CCM 
Organ C-Cell  C-Cell  C-Cell  C-Cell  
IT-S - - - - 
IT-C - Cell Phone - - 
IT-A - - - - 




Process I J K L 
Task K- Admin K- Closeout Dep Unit AAR 
Agent CCM CCM/DISBO  CCM CCM 
Organ C-Cell  C-Cell  C-Cell  FSSG 
IT-S - - - - 
IT-C - - - - 
IT-A - - - - 
N-IT Site visit Site visit - Hard Copy  
Figure 3.2 Deployed Contingency Contracting Process 
A B C D
E F G H 
I J K L 
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In the horizontal process representation, process activities are denoted by nodes in 
a graph, which are connected by arrows that denote the flow of work through the overall 
process.  Each node contains seven attributes that describe the corresponding work tasks:  
1) task name, 2) agent responsible for the task performance, 3) the organization 
associated with the activity, 4) IT used to support the activity (IT-S), 5) IT used to 
support communication (IT-C), 6) IT used to automate the activity (IT-A), and 7) non-IT 
tools and techniques used to perform the activity (N-IT).   
The following descriptions are provided to assist the reader in better 
understanding each of the processes depicted by nodes A through L. 
· Node A:  Assignment of the CCM.  The contingency contracting officer assigns 
the CCM for the upcoming exercise/deployment. 
· Node B:  Pre-Deployment Preparation.  This responsibility is left largely to the 
appointed CCM.  This entails consulting with CCMs who have participated in the 
same exercise/deployment in the past and consulting with AARs, Internet sites, 
etc.   
· Node C:  Report to Unit.  The CCM reports to the command element of the 
operational unit that he is assigned to.  Additionally, the contracting cell (C-Cell) 
is formed at this stage.  The contracting cell is comprised of a disbursing officer 
(DISBO), a comptroller, a logistics officer, and other CCMs.  Usually, the 
contracting cell will arrive in the AO prior to the arrival of the operating unit to 
establish the required logistical support infrastructure.   
· Node D:  Submission Requirements.  The CCM, with input from the members of 
the contracting cell, will determine the policy for the submission of the 
requirements by the individual units/shops.  It is important to note that requests 
from individual units/shops are “filtered” by the Supply Department (either the S-
4 or G-4, depending on scale of operation), logistics officer and comptroller prior 
to the CCM getting the request.    
· Node E:  Establishment of the Contingency Contracting Office.  The CCM is 
responsible for establishing a contracting office out of which the contracting cell 
will operate.  This entails installing phone lines, Internet access, furniture, etc.   
· Node F:  Purchasing of Goods/Supplies/Services (G/S/S).  The CCM is 
responsible for the purchase of the g/s/s that are required by the operational unit. 
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· Node G:  Paying for G/S/S.  The DISBO is responsible for ensuring that all g/s/s 
purchased by the CCM are paid for in a timely manner. 
· Node H:  Monitoring Audit Trail.  Maintaining accurate records of contractual 
actions, along with any rationale why a particular action was chosen. 
· Node I:  Contract Administration (K-Admin).  This activity is conducted on a 
daily basis by the CCM and encompasses everything from contacting potential 
vendors to following up with units to ensure that they are receiving the support 
that they require.   
· Node J:  Contract Closeout (K-Closeout).  The CCM is responsible for ensuring 
that all contractual actions are closed out prior to his departure from the operation 
(this usually means staying a few weeks after the main body has departed).  The 
DISBO is responsible for ensuring that all vendors have been paid prior to 
contract closeout.   
· Node K:  Depart Unit.  After all contracts have been closed out, the CCM 
disbands the contracting cell and all members return to their parent commands. 
· Node L:  After Action Report (AAR).  Once the CCM returns to the FSSG, he 
generates an AAR.  This AAR is usually kept at the FSSG contingency 
contracting office.   
 
As one can see in Figure 3.2, “Assignment of the CCM” requires no IT for 
scheduling (IT-S), communication (IT-C) or automation (IT-A).  Finally, no non-IT (N-
IT) support is associated with this activity.  This process continues through the other 
activity nodes depicted in Figure 3.2 and concludes with filing an AAR when the CCM 
reports back to the FSSG (node L).   
The modeled deployed contingency contracting process in Figure 3.2 supports the 
type of process analysis typically associated with process engineering.  It is here that one 
would try to understand and redesign the process.  However, by employing the KOPeR 
system (see Nissen 1998), diagnostic measurements from the process are obtained to 
support a more effective redesign of the process.  Table 3.1 shows the input 
measurements submitted for the current DCCP.  
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Input Measure  Value 
Process Size 12 
Process Length 12 
Handoffs 7 





Table 3.1 Process Input Measurements 
After entering these process measurements into KOPeR, the following diagnosis 





Parallelism 1.0 Sequential process 
Handoffs fraction 0.583 Process friction 
Feedback fraction 0.0 Feedback looks O.K. 
IT support fraction 0.083 Inadequate IT support 
IT communication 
fraction 
0.167 Inadequate IT communications 
IT automation fraction 0.0 IT automation first requires substantial 
infrastructure in terms of support and 
communications 
Table 3.2 KOPeR Diagnosis 
 
Multiple pathologies associated with the targeted process have been identified.  
The diagnosis reveals that the DCCP is a sequential process that suffers from process 
friction.  However, the lack of feedback in the DCCP does not negatively impact the 
overall process.  Most noticeably, the DCCP has a major shortcoming in the area of IT 
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support.  The IT-S fraction indicates that the DCCP lacks adequate IT support.  The IT-C 
fraction shows an inadequate amount of IT communication to support the process.  And 
finally, the IT-A fraction illustrates that not only does the DCCP suffer from a lack of IT-
automation, but also it is in need of a substantial investment of support and 
communication infrastructure.  In chapter IV, the author continues the redesign process 
and generates redesign alternatives to treat the pathologies associated with the DCCP; 
Thus, improving the DCCP.   
4. Knowledge Management Analysis 
 In support of the integrated knowledge process and system design, the horizontal 
process above is elongated to reflect its performance through time and between various 
CCMs.  This elongated process depiction augments the horizontal process graph 
presented in Figure 3.2 and also includes a vertical process that flows across various 
work process flows.  This cross perspective facilitates process design in terms of KM and 
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Figure 3.3 Deployed Contingency Contracting Vertical Processes 
 Figure 3.3 depicts the basic DCCP flow (e.g., activity nodes connected by 
directed arrows) for two instantiations of the process.  In the first instantiation, marked 
1CCM , a particular CCM would perform each of the process activities (nodes A through 
L) at a particular point in time.  At a later point in time, another CCM (depicted by 
2CCM ) would perform each of the process activities.  Since 1CCM  and 2CCM  are two 
different individuals, the level of experience and proficiency will be different.  A 
principle concern of KM addresses the consistency and efficacy across the horizontal 
process instantiations.  For example, if 2CCM  lacks the level of expertise and know how 
that 1CCM  possesses, the desired result is to ensure that the process performance of 
2CCM  is comparable to 1CCM  in terms of execution and results.  Whereas work-
process flows pertain to the performance of work in the enterprise, cross-process flows 
pertain to the process of KM itself.  The cross-process analysis represents a marked 
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would be analyzed and redesigned (Nissen and Espino, 2000).  Listed in Figure 3.3 are 
the cross-process flows associated with the deployed contingency contracting process.  
These vertical processes were identified through the research and by interviews with 
CCMs as being the requisite knowledge to conduct contingency contracting. 
The second step involves knowledge analysis.  Integrated knowledge process and 
system design requires a focus on vertical processes as well as on the horizontal work 
process counterparts (Nissen and Espino, 2000).  Although all processes depicted in the 
horizontal graph of the DCCP are recognized as being important, the research found a 
high level of interest in Nodes D (Submission Requirements), G (Paying for 
Goods/Supplies/Services), and I (Contract Administration) as key requirements to 
successfully carrying out the deployed contingency contracting process.  The following 
list of critical success factors (CFSs) has been determined by analyzing the DCCP: 
· Mission Support 
· Requirements Determination 
· Maintaining Accurate Records 
· Paying Vendors in a Timely Manner 
· Knowledge of Contracting Procedures 
Achievement of each of these CFSs and the success of the deployed contingency 
contracting process is directly proportional to the success in performing tasks D, G, and I.   
Accordingly, these tasks require a high level of experience and training.  This in turn 
targets these activities as important in terms of KM and helps focus the analysis in terms 
of integrated process system design.  Tables 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 summarize the knowledge 
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required to successfully achieve the named processes and how such knowledge is 
currently acquired.   
Knowledge Required How Knowledge is Acquired 
Identify User · Con 234 
· OJT 




· Con 234 
· Formal Training  
Developing Policy for Requirement 
Submissions 
· OJT 





Table 3.3 Knowledge Analysis of Submission Requirements 
 
Knowledge Required How Knowledge is Acquired 
Identifying Funding Source  · Con 234 
· OJT 
 
Identifying Paying Agent · U.S. Embassy 
· State Department 
· OJT 
Knowing Which laws/regulations apply · Con 234 
· OJT 
ID Method of Payment · U.S. Embassy 
· State Department  
· OJT 
Security Posture  
 
· Intelligence Section (S-2/G-2) 
· U.S. Embassy 
· OJT 
 
Table 3.4 Knowledge Analysis of Paying for Goods/Supplies/Services  
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Knowledge Required How Knowledge is Acquired 
Market Survey · Con 234 
· Formal Schooling 
· OJT 
Solicitation Process · Con 234 
· Formal Schooling 
· OJT 
Award of Contract · Con 234 
· Formal Schooling 
· OJT 
Monitoring of Vendors  
 
· Con 234 
· Formal Schooling 
· OJT 
             
   Table 3.5 Knowledge Analysis of Contract Administration Process 
It is important to note that much of this knowledge acquisition is directly related 
to the vertical processes already mentioned.   For example, CCMs must possess a certain 
level of formal training before they can participate in a contingency contracting 
environment.  These formal courses, such as the DAU’s CON 234—Contingency 
Contracting Course—provides the CCM with a basic understanding of the contracting 
policies and methods employed for contingency operations.  Unlike enlisted CCMs, 
officers must be DAWIA Level II certified before being assigned as a contracting officer 
for the Marine Corps (this level of certification is obtained at NPS).  Although formal 
training does provide the CCM with a basic knowledge of the processes associated with 
Nodes D, G and I, it does not guarantee the successful completion of these processes.   
Formal training provides the CCM with explicit knowledge.  This knowledge is 
canonical and is easily found in books and manuals.  In fact, a quick look on the Internet 
will provide the CCM with many of the laws and regulations needed.  Formal training 
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also provides the CCM with an awareness of other types of knowledge that are required 
to successfully complete processes D, G and I.  However, the knowledge requirements 
are heavily dependent on tacit knowledge and are far more difficult to encapsulate and 
transfer between CCMs.  This type of tacit knowledge development occurs 
predominantly through OJT.     
5. Contextual Analysis 
 The third step involves contextual analysis.  In Marine Corps contingency 
contracting, explicit knowledge is readily available to the CCM in various media.  
However, the Marine Corps falls short in the area of codifying the tacit knowledge that is 
required to perform the DCCP.  The reason for this lies in the fact that there is no 
formalized process to capture, create or distribute its tacit knowledge.  The majority of 
tacit knowledge is gained through OJT.   
 A major problem that the contingency contracting force encounters in regards to 
maintaining and managing its knowledge is the lack of a career path for its contracting 
officers.  Contracting officers serve in their contracting billets for a period of only three 
years.  Just when the officer’s level of expertise and confidence solidifies, he or she 
rotates back to the primary MOS in the FMF.  This is a severe blow to the capabilities of 
the contingency contracting force and its ability to successfully retain its knowledge.  The 
shortage of enlisted CCMs makes it difficult to maintain a broad base of expertise in the 
contingency contracting force.  Coupled with their responsibilities that are commensurate 
with their ranks (e.g., drill instructor duty, recruiting duty, career level school), enlisted 
CCMs are not able to maintain a solid knowledge base.   
  45 
 Another obstacle is the lack of incentives for maintaining a KMS.  As Nissen and 
Espino (2000) point out, a major challenge in maximizing such a system’s capabilities 
would be in developing the right mix of incentives for the users of the system to provide 
useful and timely input.  Currently, no incentives exist for CCMs to contribute their 
knowledge to a KMS.  Hence, KM suffers as a result.   
 Success for a CCM in carrying out processes D, G, and I is highly dependent 
upon the experience of the individual CCM.  The operating environment for CCMs can 
vary greatly, and a CCM may find himself operating in a joint contracting cell or 
operating independently in a hostile environment.   It is crucial that the CCM possess the 
knowledge and expertise to think and make decisions on their own.   
 Finally, the Marine Corps does not provide training exercises for its CCMs.  
Scenario-driven exercises could be developed that would simulate the conditions of a 
realistic contingency operating environment for CCMs.  These exercises would go a long 
way in expanding the knowledge base of the contingency contracting force.   Current  
practices, however, limit the acquisition of experience to actual contingencies and 
operations.   
6. System Design 
 The fourth step involves system design.  Information technology is an enabler 
used to implement a KM system.  However, organizations must make the commitment 
and invest seriously in IT in order to take advantage of the benefits that can be provided 
(Nissen and Espino, 2000).  As indicated by the KOPeR diagnosis, little IT is used to 
support the DCCP.  A thorough process (re)design, along with a detailed knowledge and 
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contextual analysis, is necessary before implementing IT applications at this stage of the 
analysis.   
 For example, take the process associated with AARs.  This process can be a 
useful tool in providing CCMs with the knowledge they need to be successful in a 
contingency environment.  A KM system that utilizes various data-mining technologies, 
search and retrieval tools, and video files (e.g., containing taped AARs) could be used by 
CCMs to capture the explicit and tacit knowledge tha t they need.     
 Furthermore, with respect to the defining requirements process, a KM system 
could be developed that would have a database of the various requirements that CCMs 
have acquired in the past (e.g., cranes, heavy equipment, air ports, fuel).  This system can 
make storing, organizing, and retrieving these requirements much easier and save the 
CCM a considerable amount of time in the acquisition of these needed items.  Moreover, 
this system could be made available to the user and other key personnel who have an 
impact on the requirements process to assist them in accurately describing what they 
need.  Utilizing the notion that a picture is worth a thousand words, electronic 
photographs of the requested item(s) would be attached to the requirements description.  
This would enable the user to get “eyes-on” the item being requested and ensure that it is 
indeed the item that is needed.    
7. Chapter Summary 
The Marine Corps contingency contracting force plays an important role in 
supporting deployed Marine forces during exercises and contingencies.  Therefore, the 
deployed contingency contracting process (DCCP) is selected as the targeted process for 
redesign.  Although formal knowledge is available through schooling and various 
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canonical media, there is no formal system in place that captures and utilizes the tacit 
knowledge that is generated by CCMs.  In order for there to be an effective means of 
capturing, storing, accessing, and sharing this tacit knowledge between CCMs, a KBS 
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IV. INNOVATING KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT IN MARINE 
CORPS CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING 
 Chapter IV continues the redesign process by applying knowledge management to 
the deployed contingency contracting process (DCCP).  This redesign includes 
identifying process transformations, generating redesign alternatives, and selecting a 
redesign alternative to improve the DCCP.  Chapter IV also addresses a migration 
strategy for the implementation of the selected redesign alternative.   
A. PROCESS DESIGN 
Davenport and Prusak (1998) state:  “Technology’s most valuable role in 
knowledge management is extending the reach and enhancing the speed of knowledge 
transfer.  Information technology enables the knowledge of an individual or group to be 
extracted and structured, and then used by other members of the organization….” 
By utilizing IT, organizations can more effectively capture, retain, and share their 
knowledge with its members.  IT capitalizes on the strength of those who possess the 
most skills and know-how and enrich the organization by making it available to all.  In 
this sense, IT acts as the catalyst for further knowledge generation.   
In this section, the author continues the redesign process by discussing process 
transformation and redesign alternatives for the DCCP.  These redesign alternatives are 
in-turn analyzed by KOPeR and the most promising alternative is chosen for 
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 1. Match Transformations 
Redesign transformations are mechanisms used to treat the process pathologies 
identified by the KOPeR analysis.  Table 4.1 presents pathologies identified by KOPeR 
and their associated redesign transformations.  These transformations are not mutually 
exclusive.  The following transformation definitions are provided below.   
 
Pathology Transformations 
Sequential process flows  De-linearize 
Checking & complexity 
Asynchronous reviews or 
empowerment 
Process friction Case manager or case team  
Manual process 
Integrated databases or 
workflow 
Paper-based process E-mail or workflow 
Labor-intensive process 
Expert systems or intelligent 
agents 
 
Table 4.1 Redesign Transformations 
(After Nissen, Kamel, and Sengupta 2000) 
 
De-linearization involves rearranging a sequence of process activities to be 
preformed in a more parallel or concurrent manner and is used to treat sequential process 
flows.  While this redesign transformation affects the sequence and flow of process 
activities, it does not affect either by whom or how the process is performed.  
Asynchronous reviews involve conducting reviews in parallel, while empowerment 
involves delegating responsibility to front- line employees and authorizing the people 
doing process work to ensure the quality of their work.  Empowerment entails some job 
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enlargement.   Case manager entails replacing specialized employees in a process with a 
generalist case manager or integrated team that performs all process activities from start 
to finish.   Integrated databases and workflow enriches the last three transformations 
(e.g., manual process, paper-based process, and labor-intensive process) that involve the 
use of IT solutions to support process activities.  These computer-based tools can 
augment human performance (e.g., memory, speed, thoroughness) and increase overall 
efficiency and process performance.   
The KOPeR “as-is” analysis of the current DCCP, repeated in Figure 4.1 for 
reference, indicates a severe lack of IT infrastructure.  In phases D through L, IT is not 
used to capture, store or exchange tacit knowledge that is critical to the DCCP.  This 
immature KM environment highlights the fact that the knowledge and expertise of the 
DCCP resides within a few key individuals and is not readily accessible throughout the 
organization or to other CCMs.  The lack of IT to capture DCCP tacit knowledge is 
punctuated by the high turnover rates of the contingency contracting officers and the 
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Process A B C D 
Task Assign CCM Pre -Deployment Prep Rpt to Unit Submission Reqs  
Agent CCO CCM CCM User 
Organ FSSG FSSG C-Cell  Various 
IT-S - Internet - - 
IT-C - Emails - - 
IT-A - - - _ 




Process E F G H 
Task Est. CC Office  Purch G/S/S  Pay for G/S/S  Monit Audit Trail 
Agent CCM CCM DISBO CCM 
Organ C-Cell  C-Cell  C-Cell  C-Cell  
IT-S - - - - 
IT-C - Cell Phone - - 
IT-A - - - - 




Process I J K L 
Task K- Admin K- Closeout Dep Unit AAR 
Agent CCM CCM/DISBO  CCM CCM 
Organ C-Cell  C-Cell  C-Cell  FSSG 
IT-S - - - - 
IT-C - - - - 
IT-A - - - - 
N-IT Site visit Site visit - Hard Copy  
Figure 4.1 Deployed Contingency Contracting Process 
A B C D
E F G H
I J L K
  53 
There is a number of IT solutions in use today that are used for KM (e.g., E-mail, 
knowledge inventory systems, knowledge navigation tools).  Some of these programs 
require that the user be highly knowledgeable of its use while other programs are geared 
towards the less informed user.  Figure 4.2 illustrates the dimensions of these IT 
programs.  Due to their characteristics and strengths, knowledge repositories and 
knowledge-based systems (KBS) are investigated as possible solutions to improve the IT 
aspects of the DCCP.   
Knowledge repositories serve as a vehicle that brings people together so that they 
can share and refine their expertise (Liebowitz 1999).  These knowledge repositories 
come in the form of Web and GroupWare and require that the user be knowledgeable in 
the subject because they will have to search for the knowledge that they require.  KBS 
helps to provide knowledge dissemination by automated means.  Examples of KBS 
include expert systems and intelligent agents.  These IT solutions do not require that the 
user be knowledgeable in the subject area.  However, the time required to find the 


















Figure 4.2 Key Dimensions of Knowledge Management Tools 
(From: Davenport and Prusak, 1998) 
Both knowledge repositories and KBS have the ability to capture and retain tacit 
knowledge before it is degraded or lost totally by attrition and high turnover rates.  
Additionally, each effectively shares common knowledge stored in a knowledge base and 
makes it available to other users.  For these reasons, they both offer a strong potential for 
addressing the pathologies that were noted by KOPeR. 
2. Generate Redesign Alternatives 
The Marine Corps does not provide its CCMs with a training environment that is 
conducive to building a solid tacit knowledge base.  Instead, the tacit knowledge that 
CCMs acquire comes from OJT and operational experience.  This operational experience 
is not being retained in a shared knowledge base within the contingency contracting 
force.  Although the contingency contracting force operates in different areas around the 
world, the tacit knowledge gained in one operation is also applicable to other operations.  
However, this knowledge is not easily transferable between CCMs or commands.  This 
perishable knowledge lasts only as long as the CCMs who generated the knowledge are 
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around.  Once they leave, their valuable expertise leaves with them.  The process 
redesign addresses two types of IT solutions:  knowledge repositories and KBS. 
  a.  Knowledge Repositories 
The thrust of knowledge repositories is to take the knowledge that is embodied in 
documents—memos, reports, presentations, articles, and so forth—and put it into a 
repository where it can be easily stored and retrieved (Davenport and Prusak 1998).  
Davenport and Prusak have identified the following three basic types of knowledge 
repositories: 
· External knowledge (e.g., competitive intelligence). 
· Structured internal knowledge (e.g., research reports, production oriented 
marketing materials and methods). 
· Informal internal knowledge (e.g., discussion databases full of know-how, 
sometimes referred to as “lessons learned”). 
 
 
The knowledge that is required for CCMs to operate efficiently is largely tacit in 
nature.  This tacit knowledge is usually passed on via informal methods, such as through 
war stories within the community of practice and the socialization of newcomers to 
organizational practices and methods.  Although GroupWare is not currently utilized by 
the contingency contracting community to pass on this tacit knowledge, it is well suited 
for this common means of tacit knowledge transmission. 
GroupWare is software that is designed to help teams work together in an 
electronic environment.  It offers the means to organize various types of information into 
organizational knowledge and allows access to company-wide information at any time, at 
any place and in whatever form (Srikantaiah and Koenig 2000).  The strength of 
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GroupWare lies in the fact that it enables the functioning and survival of an organization 
long after the original purveyors have departed.  Applegate et al., (1998) state: 
Information systems will maintain the corporate history, experience and 
expertise that long-term employees how hold.  The information systems 
themselves—not the people—can become the stable structure of the 
organization.  People will be free to come and go, but the value of their 
experience will be incorporated in the systems that help them and their 
successors run the business.   
One possible GroupWare application that could be used in the contingency 
contracting environment is the commercially available Lotus Notes.  Lotus is a leading 
management tool for knowledge repositories (both structured and informal) that permits 
the capture and exchange of both explicit and tacit knowledge.  The following highlight 
the strengths of the program: 
· Database management 
· Discussion-group creation and management 
· Replication of databases for remote disconnected use in the field 
· Ability to integrate web and desktop applications 
 
As previously mentioned, the contingency contracting force does not currently 
employ any groupware applications for KM.   However, with the introduction of the 
Navy-Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI), there exists a viable opportunity to implement 
Lotus Notes (or a comparable program) for the contingency contracting force.   
The implementation of Lotus technology would be the first step in creating a KM 
infrastructure for the Marine Corps contingency contracting force.  This technology has 
already proven itself in the Pacific Fleet’s KM efforts of its complicated Battle Group 
Theater Transition Process (BGTTP) (Oxedine 2000).  Figure 4.3 illustrates the redesign 
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process with GroupWare technology.  Since GroupWare facilitates electronic 
communication between users, it is annotated as an IT-communication tool (IT-C).  By 
using Groupware, CCMs will be able to share their knowledge with other CCMs and 
explain the particulars of their operating environment and the rationale for their 
decisions.  Additionally, CCMs will be able to communicate more effectively with other 
key players and organizations (e.g., venders with Internet access, funding sources, 
commands) that have a stake in the contingency contracting process.  This will facilitate a 
more streamlined means of conducting business in an environment that will support this 
type of communication.  Afterwards, both explicit and tacit knowledge from these 
exchanges will be stored in a repository that can be accessed by users of the organization 
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Process A B C D 
Task Assign CCM Pre-Deployment Prep Rpt to Unit  Submission Reqs 
Agent CCO CCM CCM User 
Organ FSSG FSSG C-Cell Various 
IT-S - Internet  - - 
IT -C - GroupWare  - GroupWare  
IT-A - - - _ 




Process E F G H 
Task Est. CC Office Purch G/S/S Pay for G/S/S Monit Audit Trail 
Agent CCM CCM DISBO CCM 
Organ C-Cell C-Cell C-Cell C-Cell 
IT-S - - - - 
IT -C - GroupWare  GroupWare  GroupWare  
IT -A - - - - 




Process I J K L 
Task K- Admin K- Closeout  Dep Unit  AAR 
Agent CCM CCM/DISBO CCM CCM 
Organ C-Cell C-Cell C-Cell FSSG 
IT-S - - - - 
IT -C GroupWare  GroupWare  - GroupWare  
IT -A - - - - 
N-IT Site visit  Site visit  - Hard Copy 
Figure 4.3 Design Alternative One—GroupWare 
A B C D
E F G H
I J K L 
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b.  Knowledge-based Systems (KBS) 
While capturing knowledge is the goal of knowledge repositories (e.g., 
GroupWare), KBS is designed to share and distribute knowledge.  Although Davenport 
(1995) states: “…successful knowledge transfer involves neithe r computers nor 
documents but rather interactions between people,” IT provides a powerful vehicle by 
which users can access information and knowledge to assist them in the decision making 
process.  KBS share and distribute knowledge by using a knowledge base and inferencing 
capability.  KBS search a knowledge base for relevant facts and patterns.  When this has 
been done, one or several solutions to the problem are then identified.  KBS are best 
suited for sharing and distributing knowledge.  For the DCCP, two types of KBS will be 
investigated—expert systems and intelligent agents.  
Liebowitz (1999) rightfully points out that no one can be trained in all areas that 
impact the decision making process.  Likewise, people do not have the time to learn a 
new subject area when they need an answer to a specific question.  Expert systems aim to 
capture a portion of an expert’s decision-making knowledge, codify it in user- friendly 
terms, and allow for its effective dissemination to users.  The strength of the expert 
system lies with its inferencing capability.  This capability can be used to assist the CCM 
throughout the DCCP by providing him with expertise to make better-informed decisions.   
The employment of an expert system in the DCCP would enhance the capabilities 
of the relatively new, less experienced CCM, and provide wise counsel to the seasoned 
CCM regarding contingency contracting issues.  Codified tacit and explicit knowledge 
regarding contracting issues (e.g., requirement definition, payment method, contract type) 
would be available to the CCM via a search function.  This would provide the CCM with 
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the targeted knowledge required for each stage of the DCCP and ensure that critical areas 
of concern are dealt with in a smart manner.  The expert system would also decrease the 
amount of time and effort that is required of the CCM for conducting analysis and 
searching for required information.  This in turn would allow the CCM to devote his 
efforts to more pressing issues.  Actions taken by the CCM would be stored by the expert 
system along with any pertinent knowledge developed by the CCM.  This knowledge 
would be codified and available to future users.   
Figure 4.4 illustrates the redesign process incorporating an expert system.  Expert 
systems improve the IT-Support (IT-S) function by integrating, analyzing, and evaluating 
the data used in the DCCP.  Additionally, IT-C is improved because it acts as an interface 
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Process A B C D 
Task Assign CCM Pre-Deployment Prep Rpt to Unit  Submission Reqs 
Agent CCO CCM CCM User 
Organ FSSG FSSG C-Cell Various 
IT-S - Expert System - Expert System 
IT-C - Expert System  - Expert System  
IT -A - - - _ 




Process E F G H 
Task Est. CC Office Purch G/S/S Pay for G/S/S Monit Audit Trail 
Agent CCM CCM DISBO CCM 
Organ C-Cell C-Cell C-Cell C-Cell 
IT-S - Expert System - - 
IT -C - Expert System  - - 
IT -A - - - - 




Process I J K L 
Task K- Admin K- Closeout  Dep Unit  AAR 
Agent CCM CCM/DISBO CCM CCM 
Organ C-Cell C-Cell C-Cell FSSG 
IT-S Expert System Expert System - Expert System 
IT-C Expert System Expert System - Expert System 
IT-A - - - - 
N-IT Site visit  Site visit  - Hard Copy 
Figure 4.4 Design Alternative Two—Expert System 
A B C D
E F G H
I J K L 
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 Maes (1994), defines an intelligent agent as a “computational systems that inhabit 
some complex dynamic environment, sense and act autonomously in this environment, 
and by doing so realize a set of goals or tasks for which they are designed.”  Foner 
(1994), succinctly defines intelligent agents as “…systems that collaborate with the users 
to improve the accomplishment of the user’s tasks.”  An intelligent agent, like an expert 
system, requires that information be codified and stored within its program.  Unlike an 
expert system, an intelligent agent uses its knowledge, rationale, and experience to 
increase its efficiency at conducting a process.  Additionally, an intelligent agent 
automates the process by integrating, analyzing, evaluating, and interpreting the data 
itself.   
An intelligent agent would automate the majority of the DCCP, from the moment 
a user submits a request to contract closeout.  Linking the DCCP electronically, the 
intelligent agent would expedite submissions, approvals, contract administration 
functions, etc.    Drawing from its evolving knowledge and experience base, the 
intelligent agent will continually improve upon the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
DCCP by providing decisions based on updated knowledge and applying it to the current 
operational environment.  Like the expert system, the intelligent agent would decrease the 
time and effort that the CCM has to devote to tedious and mundane tasks and allow the 
CCM to focus his efforts on more pressing concerns.  Utilizing an intelligent agent will 
streamline the DCCP process and allow the CCM to serve in an oversight capacity.  If a 
problem arises with a particular request, then the intelligent agent will identify the 
problem and notify the CCM who subsequently will deal with it.  If no problem occurs 
with the procurement of the requirement, then minimal involvement by the CCM will be 
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required to ensure that the requested items are delivered and the vendors are paid in a 
timely manner.   
Use of an intelligent agent benefits the IT-Automation (IT-A) of the process as 
well as the IT-C since it communicates its recommendations to the user.  Figure 4.5 
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Process A B C D 
Task Assign CCM Pre-Deployment Prep Rpt to Unit  Submission Reqs 
Agent CCO CCM CCM User 
Organ FSSG FSSG C-Cell Various 
IT-S - Internet  - - 
IT -C - - - Intelligent Agent 
IT-A - Intelligent Agent - Intelligent Agent 




Process E F G H 
Task Est. CC Office Purch G/S/S Pay for G/S/S Monit Audit Trail 
Agent CCM CCM DISBO CCM 
Organ C-Cell C-Cell C-Cell C-Cell 
IT-S - - - - 
IT -C - Intelligent Agent - - 
IT -A - Intelligent Agent - Intelligent Agent 




Process I J K L 
Task K- Admin K- Closeout  Dep Unit  AAR 
Agent CCM CCM/DISBO CCM CCM 
Organ C-Cell C-Cell C-Cell FSSG 
IT-S - - - - 
IT -C - - - - 
IT -A Intelligent Agent Intelligent Agent - Intelligent Agent 
N-IT Site visit  Site visit  - Hard Copy 
Figure 4.5 Design Alternative Three—Intelligent Agent 
A B C D
E F G H
I J K L 
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3. Test Alternatives 
The three alternative redesign transformations proposed are now analyzed 
utilizing KOPeR.  The results from this analysis are compared to the “as- is” DCCP to 
determine how well the redesign transformations treat the identified pathologies of the 
current practice.  Table 4.2 highlights the comparative findings.   
 
Input Measure  Current 
Process 
GroupWare Expert System Intelligent 
Agent 
Process Size 12 12 12 12 
Process Length  12 12 12 12 
Handoffs 7 7 7 7 
Feedback loops  0 0 0 0 
IT-S 1 1 6 1 
IT-C 2 8 6 2 
IT-A 0 0 0 7 
N-IT 8 8 8 8 
     
Parallelism 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Handoffs Fraction 0.583 0.583 0.583 0.583 
Feedback Fraction 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
IT Support Fraction 0.083 0.083 0.5 0.083 
IT Communication 
Fraction 
0.167 0.667 0.5 0.167 
IT Automation Fraction 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.583 
 
Table 4.2 KOPeR Comparative Measurements 
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In Table 4.2 the comparative measures that vary across the redesigns are 
highlighted in bold.  This promotes clarity and focuses the reader’s attention on the 
differences between the process designs.   The fractions for parallelism, handoffs, and 
feedback do not change due to the focus on providing an IT solution to the DCCP.  
Several interesting results can be interpreted from the comparative measures.  First, the 
IT-C fraction improves with the implementation of GroupWare.  But the IT-S and IT-A 
remain unchanged.  Secondly, implementation of an expert system would improve the IT-
S and IT-C fraction to an acceptable level while leaving the IT-A fraction unchanged.  
Finally, the use of an intelligent agent would show the greatest improvement in IT-A over 
any of the fractions associated with the implementation of GroupWare and expert 
systems.   However, the IT-S and IT-C fractions would remain unchanged from the 
current “as- is” process.   
4. Select Solution 
The next step in the redesign process is to select a solution that would improve the 
performance of the DCCP.  Given the current lack of KM in the Marine Corps 
contracting environment and the lack of IT infrastructure, a two-phased solution is 
proposed by the author.  This solution entails a short and long term implementation 
process that would lay the foundational base of an IT system that could be improved 
upon in the future. 
 In the short term--phase one, the Marine Corps needs to capitalize on the 
strengths of the NMCI.  The NMCI is being established to provide a more effective 
means of communication and business transactions between commands within the 
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Department of the Navy (DoN).   Herein lies the IT infrastructure that would be required 
to make KM a reality within the Marine Corps contingency contracting force.  With the 
NMCI, a GroupWare application could be implemented with relative ease.  Owing to its 
strengths of encouraging communication between individuals and organizations 
regardless of their geographic location, GroupWare is best suited to get the KM ball 
rolling in contingency contracting.  Employing GroupWare technology will serve as an 
instrument to facilitate the exchange of tacit knowledge.  Although GroupWare does not 
treat the IT-S pathology of the current DCCP, it does establish a rich knowledge 
exchange medium (e.g., the velocity and the viscosity of communication), which 
currently does not exist in the Marine Corps contingency contracting environment.  
Additionally, utilization of a GroupWare program will create a level of trust and 
confidence with the incorporation of IT into the DCCP and between users.   
As good as a GroupWare application may be for the short term, it does not 
guaranty that knowledge will be transferred within the organization or amongst users.  
GroupWare relies on personnel to share and contribute to the knowledge base.  
Additionally, GroupWare requires that the user know what knowledge he is looking for 
and where to find it.  Knowledge in a GroupWare program is predominately in text form 
and indexed by keywords.  This represents an elementary level of knowledge 
management that can make extracting knowledge difficult.  At the organizational level, if 
there is no support and a lack of incentives to share knowledge and make it a priority, 
than the KM initiative will fail.   
For the long term--phase two, the Marine Corps needs to invest in an expert 
system that would assist the contingency contracting force.  This would be an 
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improvement upon the implementation of a GroupWare program, which requires a high 
level of understanding on the subject area and time to search the knowledge repository.  
Over time however, a significant knowledge base would be created by the GroupWare 
application. This knowledge would then in turn be used to construct an expert system that 
would cater to the needs of the contingency contracting force.   This is important due to 
the fact that the knowledge stored in the repository defines the knowledge that is 
pertinent to the organization.  Implementing an expert system will allow the user to 
navigate through the knowledge base to find current key knowledge, then extract and use 
it to support the DCCP.  An expert system will ensure that key knowledge is captured, 
stored, and shared throughout the organization and amongst key players.  
Unlike the GroupWare application that requires a fair amount of knowledge on 
the part of the user, an expert system does not require the user to be highly 
knowledgeable to use.  Expert systems are characterized by heuristics, or rules of thumb, 
that specify a set of actions to be preformed for a given situation.  This is accomplished 
by the utilization of an inference engine, which automatically matches codified expert 
knowledge that is in the form of facts, against patterns to determine which rules are 
applicable to the situation.  This inference capability of the expert system can greatly 
assist the CCM in conducting the DCCP.  Using Process D, Submission Requirements, of 
the DCCP as an example, the CCM could enter a description of the required item and any 
variables that may affect the final item selected (e.g., size, weight capacity).  The expert 
system will in turn match the description entered by the CCM against patterns of similar 
requests processed in the past to select the best item for the request.  The expert system 
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will present this selection as a recommendation to the CCM who can either accept it or 
decline it.   
Intelligent agents represent a more mature and advanced means of KM.  These 
programs execute tasks on behalf of a business process, computer application, or an 
individual.  The strength of the intelligent agent lies in the fact that it uses codified 
knowledge, rationale, and experience to increase its efficiency at conducting a process.  
This would provide the CCM with a vast amount of expertise in conducting the DCCP.  
For example, in process I, Contract Administration, the intelligent agent would automate 
the entire administrative process for the CCM.  Key information would be entered into 
the intelligent agent by the CCM (e.g., contract type, contract length, delivery dates).  
The intelligent agent in turn would monitor the contract and make recommendations to 
the CCM concerning what actions are required.  Additionally, the intelligent agent would 
eliminate the time-consuming task of maintaining a myriad of contract files by the CCM.  
Contract files would be updated continuously, and be made readily available for use 
throughout the organization.   
5. Redesign Implementation 
It is important to note here that implementing an IT solution in Marine Corps 
contingency contracting is not a modification of the current practice—there is no IT 
currently in place that supports KM.  Rather, this IT strategy is one of the changes.  A 
paradigm shift will be required to implement IT into the contracting structure of the 
Marine Corps.  Most importantly, senior management must be an ardent supporter of this 
IT initiative in order for it to be successful.  Davenport and Prusak (1998), found that 
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support from organizational leaders was critical for transformational knowledge projects 
and have identified the following types of support that were helpful in doing so: 
· Sending out messages to the organization that knowledge management 
and organizational learning are critical to the organization’s success 
· Clearing the way and providing funding for infrastructure 
· Clarifying what type of knowledge is most important to the company 
 
Due to the small number of contingency contracting offices and CCMs in the 
Marine Corps, the author recommends that the GroupWare program be implemented at 
all locations throughout the contingency contracting force.  The important factor here is 
establishing a “critical mass” of users that would both contribute and benefit from the 
exchange of knowledge and information.  This would allow for maximum participation 
and feedback from the users of the program regarding what areas need to be improved 
upon, removed, and added.  Critical to the success of this GroupWare implementation 
will be the ease of operation it provides the user and the amount of satisfaction that is 
gained from it.  Again, input from the contingency contracting community will be 
essential to any KM initiative that the Marine Corps embarks upon.  
An expert system should be implemented only after the contingency contracting 
force becomes convinced of the use and benefit of the GroupWare program.  The 
GroupWare program will act as the catalyst for the design and content of the expert 
system.  For this reason, it is critical that the contingency contracting force is well versed 
in its use and application.  Once this level of comfort is obtained, the expert system will 
provide the user with a significant increase in performance and communication 
capabilities.   
  71 
B. KNOWLEDGE PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
The success of any program depends upon the results that it achieves.  People are 
most familiar with judging success upon the financial benefits or losses that are incurred 
as a result of policy action or inaction.  Although economic benefits from KM initiatives 
in private industry have been quantified, more general indicators must be relied upon to 
determine the benefits from implementing a KM program in the Marine Corps.  The 
following list of performance measurements is provided to ascertain the success of a KM 
program in contingency contracting: 
· Mission Support.  The level of support provided to an operation should be 
improved both in breath and scope.  Identifying requirements in a timelier manner 
and getting the required logistical support to the war fighter when and where he 
needs it.   
· Decision Making Process.  Everyone makes mistakes.  This is especially true in 
an environment where the current method of acquiring knowledge is in a 
deployed environment.  Helping the CCM to identify problem areas and 
equipping him with the knowledge and expertise of those who have gone before 
will provide the guideposts by which the CCM can make better- informed 
decisions.   
· Level of Familiarization.  Becoming familiar with the AO and its contracting 
particulars.  Knowing whom the vendors are, what contracting methods have been 
employed in the past and why, what the requirements were previously, etc., will 
help in the preparation of the CMM and improve the DCCP. 
· Comfort with KM.  Throughout the organization, the comfort level of 
contributing to and benefiting from KM will provide proof of its worthiness.    
· Innovation.  The ultimate measure of a KM system will be in how much users 
exchange ideas and use the knowledge acquired from these interactions to 
innovate processes and generate new knowledge within the organization.   
· Knowledge Availability.  The type and relevance of knowledge that is available 
to the user.  Is it easily accessible?  Does it provide the knowledge that I need? 
· Interaction Between Key Players .  Does the KM system allow for the 
integration and input of key players?  Does the KM system improve 
communication and understanding between these parties?    
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C. SUMMARY 
This chapter utilizes knowledge repositories and KBS (expert system and 
intelligent agent) to treat the pathologies of the current “as- is” DCCP identified by 
KOPeR.  By conducting a comparative analysis, the author chooses a two-phased IT 
implementation strategy for the Marine Corps contingency contracting force utilizing 
both GroupWare and an expert system.  In phase one—the short term, the Marine Corps 
needs to capitalize on the infrastructure of the NMCI and implement a GroupWare 
program that would serve as the catalyst for KM in the contingency contracting force.  In 
phase two, the Marine Corps needs to implement an expert system that would draw on 
the strengths of the GroupWare application and assist the contingency contracting force 
and key players to more effectively capture, store and share key knowledge.  An 
integration of both a GroupWare program and an expert system is the KM system 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Chapter V summarizes the purpose and content of this thesis.  It provides 
conclusions drawn from analyzing the deployed contingency contracting process (DCCP) 
and the redesigned alternatives that are chosen to treat the pathologies identified by 
KOPeR to improve the DCCP process.  This chapter concludes with recommendations 
for future research and the author’s final thoughts.   
A.  SUMMARY 
The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General J.L. Jones, has referred to the 
Marine Corps as the Nation’s “Total Force in Readiness” (DoN, 2000).  With capabilities 
that span the spectrum of conflict, the Marine Corps has been called at an ever increasing 
rate to support operations ranging from humanitarian relief to armed combat.   
Keeping deployed Marine Forces supported and mission capable is the result of a 
monumental logistical effort.  Due to limited transport assets and funding availability, 
deployed forces often need support from the local economy to maintain their operational 
readiness and capabilities.  Marine Corps contingency contracting   provides the means of 
support that traditional supply channels cannot provide in a deployed/contingency 
environment.  
Contingency contracting Marines (CCMs) must be well versed in a number of 
areas in order to provide support to the operational commander and the war fighter.  This 
entails a sizeable investment in formal schooling and OJT.  Over time, CCMs develop a 
high level of contingency contracting expertise and knowledge that is critical to the 
mission of the Marine Corps.   
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There are several problems that exist within the contingency contracting force that 
are detracting from its ability to support deployed Marine Forces.  First of all, there is no 
career track for Marine Corps contracting officers.  All of the knowledge and expertise 
that is acquired by contingency contracting officers is lost when they depart the 
contracting force (e.g., returns to original MOS or departs service).  Secondly, the small 
number of CCMs, both enlisted and officer, is inadequate to support deployed Marine 
Forces.  And thirdly, there currently exists no means of capturing, storing, and sharing the 
tacit knowledge that is generated by CCMs.  This is a severe shortcoming for the Marine 
Corps.  
The author’s goal in this thesis is to improve the deployed contingency 
contracting process (DCCP) performance.  By implementing the KM design process of 
Nissen, Kamel, and Sengupta, (2000), the author envisions a knowledge management 
system that effectively captures and transfers tacit knowledge between CCMs and key 
players in the contingency environment.   
B. CONCLUSIONS 
 The author identifies the DCCP as the target process for redesign due to the 
importance it plays in supporting deployed Marine Forces.  The KOPeR analysis 
identifies several pathologies with the current “as-is” process.  The IT-Support (IT-S), IT-
Communication (IT-C) and IT-Automation (IT-A) fractions all reveal significant 
shortcomings in how the DCCP is conducted.  The analysis also indicates that the DCCP 
is characterized as being a manual process that lacks the IT infrastructure to capture, store 
and share knowledge amongst users in the contingency contracting environment.   
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 From the research conducted, the author has found that the KM design process of 
Nissen, Kamel and Sengupta (2000) could be applied to other organizations within the 
Marine Corps, especially with supply, maintenance, and logistical organizations.  The 
KM design process would help identify pathologies with current practices and offer 
redesign alternatives.  These organizations are complex in nature and require the benefit 
of the knowledge that is generated by its practitioners to ensure that the best possible 
level of support is afforded to the war fighter. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
As indicated by the KOPeR analysis, the DCCP suffers from a number of 
pathologies.  In order to address these pathologies, IT is selected as the process 
transformation to improve the DCCP performance.  Knowledge repositories and 
knowledge-based systems (KBS) are selected due to their ability to capture, store and 
share knowledge.   
 Based on the current KM environment in contingency contracting, the author 
recommends that the Marine Corps implement a two-phased IT strategy.  In the short 
term, phase one, the Marine Corps needs to implement a GroupWare program that will 
capitalize on the strengths and flexibility of the Navy and Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI).    
A GroupWare application will lay the foundation for knowledge exchange and storage 
within the contingency contracting force and with key players involved in the DCCP.  
The knowledge acquired from the GroupWare application will in- turn be used to 
construct an expert system that will be implemented in phase two, the long term IT 
solution.  In combination, both the GroupWare application and expert system will 
increase the velocity and viscosity of knowledge exchange, storage, and generation 
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within the contingency contracting force and ensure better operational support to 
deployed Marine Corps Forces.   
Based on the research and interviews conducted, the author makes the following 
recommendations regarding KM in Marine Corps contingency contracting: 
· Do Away with K-21.  The Marine Corps KM site, K-21, does not serve in the 
capacity that it was initially intended for.  This is evidenced by the fact that its 
intended audience, contracting Marines, do not utilize it to exchange knowledge 
or information.  K-21 treats knowledge as a static entity and has not allowed for 
the dynamic and fluid aspects of KM.  This is evidenced by the lack of oversight 
at HQMC (LBO) in maintaining the K-21 site and the contractual agreement that 
prevents HQMC (LBO) from making all but the simplest modifications to the web 
site.  Do away with K-21 and replace it with a GroupWare application such as 
Lotus Notes. 
· Better Equip CCMs.  For being such an integral part of the support structure for 
deployed Marine Forces, CCMs are inadequately equipped to effectively carry out 
their mission.  Marines always “make it happen,” but if there are resources 
available (e.g., commercial of the shelf items) that could expedite a process—
especially the DCCP— then these technologies need to be vigorously pursued and 
implemented throughout the contingency contracting force.  Tools such as Palm 
Pilots, lap top computers, digital cameras, satellite cell phones, wireless Internet 
access, and others, need to be part of the CCM’s repertoire.  These tools will 
assist the CCM to “shoot, move, and communicate” more effectively and enable 
KM to take hold. 
· Create Incentive System for KM.  One of the shortcomings of the K-21 site is 
that its intended audience has no incentive to use it.  HQMC (LBO) needs to 
establish an incentive system that would encourage the use of KM within 
contingency contracting.  One idea would be to establish an award for the most 
innovative use of KM in the DCCP.  Another idea would be to have CCMs 
officially recognized for their efforts.  This would breed a higher level of job 
satisfaction and act as a catalyst for the recognized CCM to share his knowledge 
with other CCMs. 
· Create Career Track for Contracting Officers .  KM is dependent on the 
knowledge and expertise of its practitioners.  Serious consideration needs to be 
given to maintaining the corporate knowledge base that the Marine Corps has 
invested so much in terms of educating and training its contracting officers, but 
looses after three short years.  Utilizing the model proposed in the thesis by 
Corcoran (2000), and the Army’s Acquisition Corps and the Air Force’s 
Contracting Command as benchmarks, the Marine Corps needs to implement a 
career path for its contracting officers.  This will ensure that the corporate 
  77 
contracting knowledge base is retained and that this high- level of expertise is 
better utilized by the Marine Corps.   
 
D. FUTURE RESEARCH 
The author presents three areas that are worthy of future research.  These topics 
are not covered in this thesis due to space and scope considerations.  These areas will 
support and enhance the performance of the DCCP. 
1. Other DCCP Applications  
A common theme that continually surfaced throughout the interview and research 
process was the number of individuals and units who were in some way, shape or form 
involved in the DCCP.  These units and individuals come not only from within the 
deployed unit, but from other services (joint operations), countries and agencies.  To 
make support of deployed Marine Forces more efficient and responsive, the relationship 
amongst these agencies and individuals (e.g., finance, vendors, supply, motor pool, 
aviation maintenance shops) needs to be investigated.  With this in mind, a KM system 
needs to be designed that would facilitate communication and support among all those 
involved.    
2. Incentivizing KM in the Contingency Contracting Force 
Being that the Marine Corps is not a “for profit institution,” creating an 
environment where incentives could be used to motivate its practitioners to use a KM 
system is a major challenge.  The Marine Corps lacks the ability to issue monetary 
incentives to those who contribute to and benefit from a KM system.  The Marine Corps 
needs to investigate what type(s) of incentives would encourage practitioners to 
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contribute to and benefit from a KM environment not only in contingency contracting, 
but also throughout the Marine Corps.   
3. Other KM Applications  
Due to the huge investment of money, personnel and time required to implement a 
KM program, the Marine Corps needs to investigate the possibility of moving towards an 
already established and proven KM system with one of the other services, either with the 
Army or with the Air Force.   Specifically, what would the requirements be to make this 
transition and what would the costs be both in terms of money and shared control of KM 
assets?    
E. FINAL THOUGHTS 
 Contingency contracting is a key element in supporting deployed Marine Forces.  
Confronted with an ever-changing environment, CCMs must possess the ability to think 
on their feet and make the best- informed decisions that they can possibly make.  Given 
the current lack of KM in the contingency contracting force and the high turnover rates 
among its officers and small number of enlisted personnel, the Marine Corps needs to 
aggressively pursue a KM system to capture, store and share the knowledge that is 
specific to contingency contracting.   This knowledge is the leverage by which support is 
improved and operational readiness remains high.  The redesigned alternatives proposed 
in this thesis, if implemented, will offer the potential to improve the DCCP performance 
and knowledge sharing in the contingency contracting community.  By employing these 
measures, the contingency contracting force will be better equipped to ensure that the 
Marine Corps remains the Nation’s Total Force in Readiness. 
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